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the French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) is known 
primarily for his conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, which was an essential 
reference for the later Foucault. an aspect of his work that has received less attention is 
a set of methodological reflections on intellectual history and on the relationship between 
philosophy and history. Hadot was trained initially as a philosopher and was interested in 
existentialism as well as in the convergence between philosophy and poetry. yet he chose 
to become a historian of philosophy and produced extensive philological work on neo-Pla-
tonism and ancient philosophy in general. He found a philosophical rationale for this shift 
in his encounter with Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the mid-1950s (Hadot was one of Witt-
genstein’s earliest French readers and interpreters). For Hadot, ancient philosophy must be 
understood as a series of language games, and each language game must be situated within 
the concrete conditions in which it happened. the reference to Wittgenstein therefore sup-
ports a strongly contextualist and historicist stance. It also supports its exact opposite: 
presentist appropriations of ancient texts are entirely legitimate, and they are the only way 
ancient philosophy can be existentially meaningful to us. Hadot addresses the contradiction 
by embracing it fully and claiming that his own practice aims at a coincidence of opposites 
(a concept borrowed from the Heraclitean tradition). For Hadot the fullest and truest way 
of doing philosophy is to be a philosopher and a historian at the same time.
Keywords: Hadot, Wittgenstein, coherence, misunderstanding, objectivity, exegesis, phi-
lology, rhetoric, coincidentia oppositorum
the French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) be-
came known in the United States thanks to arnold davidson, who introduced him 
to the english-speaking public in a 1990 Critical Inquiry article and called him 
the single most important influence behind the later Foucault and his concept of 
the care of the self.2 His fame in his own country came a few years later, with the 
publication of a book entitled Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?3 In it Hadot 
developed an opinion he had held for a long time, namely that ancient philoso-
phy was primarily a set of concrete practices aimed at shaping the soul, and that 
1. thanks to Sandra laugier, Samuel moyn, melvin richter, and dorothea von mücke for com-
ments and suggestions.
2. arnold davidson, “Spiritual exercises and ancient Philosophy: an Introduction to Pierre 
Hadot,” Critical Inquiry 16 (1990), 75-82. See michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, transl. robert 
Hurtley (New york: Vintage books, 1988–1990, III.
3. Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: gallimard, Folio essais, 1995).
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ancient philosophers were much more interested in pursuing this goal than they 
were in achieving doctrinal coherence. Very few studies of Hadot’s work have 
been published so far, aside from davidson’s articles and prefaces. The first col-
loquium dedicated to Hadot’s work, organized by arnold davidson, Jean-charles 
darmon, and Frédéric Worms, took place at the École normale supérieure in 2007. 
Hadot himself was in attendance and spoke about a broad range of topics. He was 
in attendance again and made some brief comments at a small event on the occa-
sion of the publication of the proceedings, on april 12, 2010.5 this was his last 
public appearance. He died on april 2, 2010 at the age of 88.
Up until very recently, in the small number of studies that did mention him, 
Hadot was almost always considered in relation to Foucault.6 yet as davidson no-
ticed in 0, aside from Hadot’s influence on Foucault, one aspect worthy of at-
tention was “a reflection on the methodological problems one faces in studying the 
history of thought.”7 Hadot never made a systematic exposition of his method (this 
would have gone against his understanding of philosophy itself) but in prefaces, 
interviews, footnotes, and digressions, he expressed himself forcefully on a num-
ber of issues that are familiar to intellectual historians, including the relationship 
between philosophy and history and the translation of past conceptual schemes 
into modern ones. He also claimed intriguingly that to write the history of thought 
is “to write the history of misunderstandings (contresens).”8 Hadot developed a 
distinctive voice as a philosopher and intellectual historian, even though he had 
no part in the debates surrounding the cambridge school9 or Koselleck’s history 
of concepts.10 He was, nonetheless, indirectly connected with Begriffsgeschichte 
through his engagement with Hans blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology11 
and through his critique of gadamer’s hermeneutics.12 the most important event 
in his intellectual development was his encounter with Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
in the mid-1950s, long before anyone else in France was paying attention to this 
. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, edited with an introduction by arnold I. davidson, 
transl. michael chase (oxford: blackwell, 1995).
5. L’Enseignement des antiques, l’enseignement des modernes, ed. arnold davidson and Frédéric 
Worms (Paris: editions rue d’Ulm/Presses de l’École normale supérieure, 2010). Video recording of 
the event at: http://www.diffusion.ens.fr/video_stream/2010_0_12_hadot.mov (accessed october 1, 
2010).
6. See cory Wimberly, “the Joy of difference: Foucault and Hadot on the aesthetic and the Uni-
versal in Philosophy,” Philosophy Today 53, no. 2 (2009), 191-202; thomas Flynn, “Philosophy as a 
Way of life: Foucault and Hadot,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 31, nos. 5-6 (2005), 609-622.
7. davidson, “Spiritual exercises and ancient Philosophy,” 275. See davidson’s discussion of 
Hadot’s method in Philosophy as a Way of Life, 2-19.
8. Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, transl. michael 
chase (cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 17 (Le Voile d’Isis: Essai sur l’histoire de l’idée 
de nature [Paris: gallimard, 200]).
9. See Quentin Skinner, “meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 
8, no. 1 (1969), 3-53; Skinner, Visions of Politics (cambridge, UK: cambridge University Press, 
2002), I.
10. otto brunner, Werner conze, and reinhart Koselleck, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Histori-
sches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–1997).
11. See Hadot, The Veil of Isis, x-xi. on blumenberg and Begriffsgeschichte, see Hans erich 
bödecker, Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte (göttingen: Wallstein Ver-
lag, 2002).
12. See Hadot, Le Voile d’Isis, 16.
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philosopher. What made Hadot unusual in the French intellectual landscape was 
that he was a philosopher and a historian at the same time: not someone who oc-
cupied a middle ground between history and philosophy; not someone who made 
a conventional call for a dialogue between the two disciplines; but someone who 
made the seemingly implausible claim that his work was both entirely historical 
and entirely philosophical. In this article, I would like to propose an analysis and 
a critical assessment of this claim.
I. Hadot’S UNcoNVeNtIoNal career
born in Paris on February 21, 1922, Hadot became professor of Hellenistic and 
roman thought at the collège de France in 1982 and taught there until his retire-
ment in 1991. He was elected professor with the support and encouragement of 
michel Foucault, who had himself been on the collège de France faculty since 
1970. like Foucault in his later years, Hadot had an interest in the Hellenistic 
tradition of studying the lives of philosophers. In this tradition, telling the story 
of a philosopher’s life is philosophically meaningful. Hadot seems to have been 
a very private and discreet person. However, in his later years, he came forward 
with significant biographical information about himself. These autobiographical 
disclosures, some of them quite intimate, were clearly intended as philosophical 
statements. they can be found in a series of conversations with Jeannie carlier 
and Arnold Davidson, first published in France in 200,13 in the public conversa-
tion between Hadot and davidson at the École normale supérieure in 2007 (pub-
lished in 2010),1 and in the preface Hadot wrote in 200 for a new edition of his 
work on Wittgenstein.15
Hadot worked in relative obscurity for most of his life, and his career did not 
follow the standard trajectory. the most prominent philosophers who came of age 
in France in the 1950s had very similar career paths: michel Foucault, Jacques 
derrida, and gilles deleuze were all students at the École normale supérieure and 
they were all tutored by louis althusser for the agrégation in philosophy. Hadot 
was neither a normalien nor an agrégé. born into a lower-middle-class family, he 
grew up in reims, in the champagne region of France. His father, who had no for-
mal education, rose through the ranks to become a manager in the Piper Heidsieck 
wine company. His maternal grandfather was a man from lorraine who had opted 
for French citizenship following the annexation of the province by germany in 
1871. Hadot’s cousins from lorraine spoke little or no French, even though lor-
raine had been returned to France in 1918, and he communicated with them in 
german. a quasi-native familiarity with german language and culture was an 
important part of Hadot’s intellectual persona. Hadot’s mother was an extremely 
13. Pierre Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness: Conversations with Jeannie Carlier and 
Arnold I. Davidson, transl. marc djaballah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) (La Philoso-
phie comme manière de vivre: Entretiens avec Jeannie Carlier et Arnold I. Davidson [Paris: albin 
michel, 2001]).
1. “entretien entre Pierre Hadot et arnold I. davidson,” École normale supérieure, Paris, June 
1, 2007, in davidson and Worms, ed., L’Enseignement des antiques, l’enseignement des modernes, 
19-3.
15. Pierre Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites du langage (Paris: Vrin, 200).
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devout catholic who insisted that each of her three sons should become a priest, 
and did indeed get her wish. Hadot was ordained in 19 but was never interested 
in becoming a parish priest. He joined the cNrS (the newly established national 
research institute) in 199 and left the priesthood in 1952 to get married. a divorce 
ensued a few years later. In 1966 he married a german-born scholar, Ilsetraut 
marten, with whom he co-authored a volume on the commentary of epictetus by 
Simplicius.16 looking back in his old age at his formative years, Hadot described 
his departure from the christian faith as a very slow process, which did not get 
in the way of his friendships with members of the catholic clergy. He credited 
his training as a priest for his familiarity with latin and greek literature, and also 
for his early interest in philosophy, which went beyond thomism and included 
bergson, who was widely read in catholic seminaries in the 1930s. Hadot ini-
tially considered writing his doctoral dissertation on Heidegger and rilke under 
the direction of Jean Wahl (1888–197), the very active and prominent Sorbonne 
professor who had spent World War II in exile in the United States after escaping 
from the drancy internment camp, and co-founded the École libre des Hautes 
Études in New york in 192. Instead, he chose to work under the direction of a 
Jesuit scholar, Paul Henry (1906–198), and to follow Henry’s suggestion that he 
should produce a critical edition of marius Victorinus, a fourth-century neo-Pla-
tonic philosopher. “I became a historian following my encounter with the Jesuit 
scholar Paul Henry,” Hadot said in 2007.17 Jean Wahl was reportedly very upset 
with this “defection.”18 In accordance with the French academic tradition of the 
time, Hadot spent twenty years of his life working on this edition before present-
ing it as a thèse d’Etat. He became a directeur d’études in the fifth section (reli-
gious studies) of the École pratique des hautes études in 196, and taught latin 
and greek patristics there until his election to the collège de France.
In his autobiographical statements, Hadot does not go into much detail regard-
ing the reasons for his choice of a dissertation topic. He seems to imply that his 
natural inclination was modern philosophy and that he made a conscious decision 
to go against this inclination by working on an antiquarian topic. marius Victo-
rinus was not particularly interesting philosophically and was also unusually dif-
ficult to make sense of. However, Hadot always made it clear that he did not regret 
those twenty years spent elucidating a minor and nearly incomprehensible author, 
because this experience taught him “how to read texts scientifically.”19 before he 
started to work on marius Victorinus, Hadot could read latin and greek because 
of the humanist education he had received as a seminarian, but he knew nothing of 
the techniques of philology and had very little sense of history. Neo-Platonic phi-
losophy was an acquired taste, as was the practice of philology. Hadot thought of 
himself and presented himself as a philosopher who chose to become a historian.
one of Hadot’s tasks as a cNrS researcher in the 1950s was to produce content 
summaries of scholarly journals coming from abroad. It is in this context that he was 
16. Ilsetraut and Pierre Hadot, Apprendre à philosopher dans l’Antiquité : L’enseignement du 
Manuel d’Epictète et son commentaire néo-platonicien (Paris: livre de poche, 200).




initially exposed to Wittgenstein, an author who was virtually unknown in France 
at the time and was not translated until 1961 by Pierre Klossowski (Hadot made 
a complete French translation of the Tractatus for his own use in the late 1950s). 
at the invitation of Jean Wahl, Hadot gave a public talk on the Tractatus on april 
29, 1959. the location was the collège philosophique, the go-to place for aspiring 
and established philosophers alike because of its perceived ability to confer social 
prestige and scholarly recognition at the same time. Jean Wahl immediately ac-
cepted the paper for publication in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale.20 this 
was followed by two articles in Critique the same year (one on the Tractatus, and 
the other on the Philosophical Investigations21), and yet another one two years later 
in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale on philosophy and language games.22 
Hadot sent the first Critique article to elizabeth anscombe, Wittgenstein’s student, 
friend, and commentator. She replied that it gave “an excellent popular account” of 
Wittgenstein’s work. She added that it had “the unusual merit of presenting an ac-
count which seems to be derived purely from what Wittgenstein said and not from 
what russell or the Vienna circle philosophers held him to mean.”23 Hadot must 
have been touched by these comments, anxious as he was to remain faithful to the 
intent of the thinkers he was interpreting (more on this later).
Hadot’s articles on Wittgenstein were collected in a small volume published 
by Vrin in 200. In the preface he wrote for this edition, Hadot uses the language 
of conversion narratives to present his encounter with Wittgenstein.2 the analy-
sis of language he found in Wittgenstein was “revolutionary.”25 It provoked “an 
overturning”26 (bouleversement) of his philosophical views. Finally, and this is a 
crucial point for Hadot: “all kinds of perspectives opened up for me in my work 
as a historian of philosophy.”27 Whether or not the epiphany described here was an 
actual event, it provides a turning point in the autobiography and serves the same 
symbolic purpose as the Tolle lege scene in augustine’s Confessions. What are 
these new perspectives? they can be summarized in a somewhat cryptic formula, 
taken from the Philosophical Investigations: “Understanding a sentence is much 
more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think.”28
20. Pierre Hadot, “réflexions sur les limites du langage à propos du Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus de Wittgenstein,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 63 (1959), 69-8.
21. Pierre Hadot, “Wittgenstein philosophe du langage –I” Critique 19 (1959), 866-881; Hadot, 
“Wittgenstein philosophe du langage –II” Critique 150 (1959), 972-983.
22. Pierre Hadot, “Jeux de langage et philosophie,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 67 (1962), 
330-33.
23. letter from elizabeth anscombe to Pierre Hadot, october 10, 1959, in Hadot, Wittgenstein et 
les limites du langage, 106.
2. on philosophy and conversion, see Pierre Hadot, article on “conversion,” Encyclopaedia 
Universalis, 20 vols. (Paris: encyclopaedia britannica, 1968). 
25. Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites du langage, 11.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (PI), transl. g. e. m. anscombe (New york: 
macmillan, 1953), §527, quoted by Hadot in Wittgenstein et les limites du langage, 11.
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II. UNderStaNdINg a SeNteNce IS lIKe UNderStaNdINg a mUSIcal tHeme
Hadot credits Wittgenstein for showing him that the primary function of language 
is not to name objects or designate thoughts. Wittgenstein illustrates this point by 
describing the way one speaks of a musical theme. on the one hand, words seem 
unable to convey what a particular musical theme is about: “one would like to say 
‘because I know what it’s all about.’ but what is it all about? I should not be able 
to say.”29 on the other hand, using words is in fact possible. For instance, one may 
make comparisons “with something else which has the same rhythm” and say 
things like “‘don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn’ or ‘this is 
as it were a parenthesis.’”30 Wittgenstein’s use of a musical example supports his 
polemical stance against a mentalist conception of language that associates words 
and sentences with inner images or feelings and assumes that understanding a 
sentence means having access to those inner images or feelings. If one assumes 
the reality of those inner images or feelings, it should be possible to describe them 
in different ways and still designate the same images or feelings. yet for Wittgen-
stein the opposite is true: understanding a musical theme means understanding 
something that only this particular musical theme says. this is generally accepted 
in the case of music, because it is usually assumed that music does not refer to 
anything beyond itself. Wittgenstein’s paradoxical point is that what is true of 
music is in a sense true of language in general.
In the Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein refers to the use of the phrase “a 
man is musical.”31 He notices that we do not use this phrase to designate someone 
who says “ah!” when a piece of music is being played. this would be tantamount 
to calling a dog musical because it wags its tail when music is being played. a 
man is musical when he is able to play the language game that consists in showing 
his appreciation of music. At first, it seems very difficult (if not impossible) to find 
words to describe what is unique about a particular piece, but experience shows 
that those who have good aesthetic judgment manage to find the words (anything 
that works will do here) and actually agree with others (who have equally good 
judgment) that these words are indeed well chosen. the same analysis could be 
made of a game that would consist in describing the aroma of coffee.32 this nei-
ther proves nor requires the existence of something beyond the words themselves 
that would make the agreement possible. It simply describes a language game that 
consists in agreeing (or disagreeing) about the characterization of a musical theme 
or a sentence.
For Wittgenstein however, the musical analogy captures only one aspect of 
what is going on in understanding a sentence:
29. PI, 527.
30. Ibid.
31. ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious 
Belief (LA), ed. cyril barrett (oxford: blackwell, 1966), 17.
32. PI, 610.
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We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another 
which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by another. (any 
more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; 
in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Under-
standing a poem).33 
on the one hand, understanding a sentence means understanding what is unique 
about this sentence. on the other hand, it means understanding something that 
could be expressed in different ways. For Wittgenstein, these are not two separate 
and unrelated meanings of “understanding.” on the contrary, “these kinds of use of 
‘understanding’ make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding.”3
this analysis of “understanding” is fundamentally important for Hadot because 
it captures the contradiction that is at the heart of historical understanding in gen-
eral and intellectual history in particular. on the one hand, a historian who strives 
to say what is unique about a particular utterance will be very careful to avoid 
anachronistic interpretations. as a philosopher, Wittgenstein was not particularly 
interested in history, but Hadot sees his philosophy of language as supporting a 
strongly historicist stance. as Wittgenstein puts it, “what belongs to a language 
game is a whole culture.”35 If you want to describe musical taste, “you have to 
describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only 
give them, etc., etc.” In other words, “to describe a set of aesthetic rules fully 
means really to describe the culture of a period.”36 For Hadot, this is the philo-
sophical foundation of the historian’s duty “to aim for objectivity and, if possible, 
for truth.”37 It is of paramount importance to avoid anachronistic readings and to 
resituate the works “within the concrete conditions in which they were written.”38 
this means looking at philosophical, rhetorical, or poetic traditions, as well as 
material conditions, including the educational and social milieu, and the mate-
rial constraints involved in committing something to writing.39 Hadot’s seemingly 
old-fashioned allegiance to strict norms of objectivity is not grounded in the belief 
that reading old texts in context will somehow give us access to “things as they 
actually happened.” In Wittgenstein’s terms, this would be just as absurd as saying 
that understanding a musical theme means understanding the things it describes. 
What makes a strictly objective approach necessary is the need to play the lan-
guage game in the right way and to do justice to what is unique about a particular 
utterance or set of utterances. an example of Hadot’s approach is his adamant re-
jection of psychological readings of ancient philosophers. conventional readings 
of the Meditations of marcus aurelius have emphasized what seems to give us 
access to his interiority: “the hesitations, contradictions and strugglings of a man 




36. Ibid., 25, note 3.
37. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 67.
38. Ibid., 68.
39. Ibid.
0. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 61.
tHe teetH oF tIme 27
mental content is simply an anachronistic projection of modern categories. an 
objective reader will be “rather astounded by the firmness of the thought and the 
technical nature of the philosophical vocabulary one encounters from beginning 
to end of the Meditations.”1 the language game played in the Meditations is not 
the romantic expression of a self; it is the rehearsal of Stoic arguments aimed at 
achieving peace of mind.
on the other hand, as Wittgenstein puts it, “the thought in the sentence is some-
thing common to different sentences.” What a text from the past says can be said in 
different words without distortion or betrayal: the same things can be said in many 
different ways. For Hadot, this other aspect of the meaning of “understanding” is 
the philosophical foundation of deliberately presentist appropriations of old texts, 
as well as freewheeling cross-cultural comparisons. Painstaking reconstruction of 
the meaning of an ancient author always yields the same realization: “the mean-
ing intended by the ancient author is never current (actuel). It is ancient, and that 
is all there is to it.”2 However, ancient philosophies like epicureanism or Sto-
icism describe some basic attitudes that are perfectly valid today, once they have 
been detached from their historical context. Similarly, Hadot is comfortable draw-
ing parallels between Pyrrho and the chinese philosopher lie yukou, who both 
found wisdom in taking care of mundane tasks and living their lives as everybody 
else did.3 “In the final analysis,” Hadot argues, “there are relatively few possible 
attitudes with respect to our existence, and, irrespective of historical influence, 
different civilizations have been led to similar attitudes.”
III. tHe INcoHereNce oF aNcIeNt PHIloSoPHy
Hadot claims that one of the essential lessons he drew from his encounter with 
Wittgenstein’s thought is the paramount importance of literary form in the prac-
tice of philosophy. the prime example in that regard is the Tractatus itself. this 
is why, in the small volume that gathers his own articles on Wittgenstein, Hadot 
found it necessary to include an article by Gottfried Gabriel on the significance of 
literary form in the Tractatus.5 gabriel shows that Wittgenstein hated russell’s 
preface to the Tractatus because it gave a paraphrase of the logical propositions of 
the work. russell understood Wittgenstein’s sentences in the sense in which they 
could be replaced by others that said the same, but not in the sense in which they 
could not be replaced by another. gabriel refers to the famous letter to von Ficker 
where Wittgenstein writes that the Tractatus is both philosophical and literary, 
and insists that nothing should be changed, not even the spelling. the “ethical 
sense” of the Tractatus cannot be taught. It can only be shown and experienced. 
It is the experience of “bumping against the wall of language.” the aphorism is 
the ideal vehicle for this experience. It puts forward propositions that are neither 
1. Ibid.
2. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 68 (translation modified).
3. Ibid., 69-70.
. Ibid., 69 (translation modified).
5. gottfried gabriel, “la logique comme littérature? remarques sur la signification de la forme 
littéraire chez Wittgenstein,” in Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites du langage, 111-126 (“logik als 
literatur? Zur bedeutung des literarischen bei Wittgenstein,” Merkur 32 [1978], 353-362).
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“true” or “not true” (in the sense of logical and empirical truth) but nonsensical. 
they point the way toward a “just” perception of the world (amazement that the 
world is). this cannot be said; it can only be shown. In that sense, extracting a 
doctrinal content from the aphorisms of the Tractatus, as russell did, misses the 
point of the entire book.
this is why philological skills and a historical approach are necessary for the 
understanding of philosophy in general: “the primary quality of a historian of 
philosophy, and probably of a philosopher, is to have a historical sense.”6 Hadot 
claims that a fundamental principle in his approach to the history of philosophy is 
a principle he learned from his dissertation advisor, Paul Henry, who was first and 
foremost a philologist. Historians of philosophy are in the business of comparing 
doctrines and looking for influences and traditions of thought. Yet Hadot says, 
“the great idea I retained from Paul Henry is that only literal and not doctrinal 
comparisons are conclusive.”7 It is easy to make comparisons based on vague 
similarities or commonplaces that can be found in many authors. However, “this 
proves nothing at all.”8 one must look for objective evidence such as repeated 
literal borrowings, or the appropriation of very specific conceptual structures ex-
pressed in a recognizable vocabulary, such as the ternary scheme that epictetus 
and marcus aurelius have in common.9 Here again, the rule is to understand a 
sentence in the way in which it cannot be replaced by another.
Hadot presents his encounter with Wittgenstein as having given a philosophical 
foundation to the philological approach he had been practicing since the begin-
ning of his doctoral research. In addition, doing philology in this spirit allowed 
him to solve a problem that puzzled conventional historians of philosophy: the 
apparent incoherence of ancient philosophers. there are countless contradic-
tions in Plato and aristotle, and a traditional exercise for historians of philosophy 
has been to account for these contradictions by reconstructing the coherence of 
their doctrines or supposing an evolution in their thinking. However, according 
to Hadot, this overlooks the nature of ancient philosophy as a concrete practice, 
which was grounded in the oral exercise of question and answer:
although every written work is a monologue, the philosophical work is always implic-
itly a dialogue. the dimension of the possible interlocutor is always present within it. 
this explains the incoherencies and contradictions which modern historians discover with 
astonishment in the work of ancient philosophers. In philosophical works such as these, 
thought cannot be expressed according to the pure, absolute necessity of a systematic order. 
rather, it must take into account the level of the interlocutor, and the concrete tempo of the 
logos in which it is expressed. It is the economy proper to a given logos which conditions 
its thought content, and it is the logos that constitutes a living system which, in the words 
of Plato, “ought to have its own body . . . it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a 
middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work” (Phaedrus, 
26c).50




50. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 105.
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When greek philosophers spoke of logos, they did refer to a coherent discourse, 
but it was the coherence of a particular discourse at a particular time: the response 
to one specific question. As Hadot puts it, “each logos is a ‘system’ but the totality 
of logoi written by an author does not constitute a system.”51 It is therefore futile 
to look for the coherence of aristotle’s philosophy as a whole, or to try to divide it 
up into successive coherent periods. thus Hadot refers approvingly to the classic 
work of Ingemar düring,52 who showed that aristotle approaches a problem or a 
group of problems over and over again from different angles. each new treatment 
begins with the phrase: “Now taking a different starting point . . . ” and arrives 
at a conclusion that is not necessarily consistent with the previous treatment.53 
according to Hadot, düring’s description “can in fact apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
almost all the philosophers of antiquity.”5
From Hadot’s perspective, the concept of mentalité collective, used by some 
historians, proceeds from the same fallacy as the assumption of coherence in an 
individual author. In a brief, polemical piece initially published in the bulletin of 
the collège de France in 198, Hadot criticized those historians who think they 
can describe the mentalité of an entire period like the age of marcus aurelius.55 
these descriptions, he argued, are based on a “methodological mistake.”56 What 
was written in the second century ce was determined by a multiplicity of local and 
national traditions of a religious, political, philosophical, and rhetorical nature, 
and not by the spirit of the age. there is no such thing as the collective mentality 
of the roman empire of the second century. one can only speak of discrete tradi-
tions and practices. 
this is where Hadot’s most important and famous insight about ancient phi-
losophers comes in: that their goal was, in Victor goldschmidt’s words, “to form, 
more than to inform.”57 Hadot repeated this formula in various places, and the fact 
that he borrowed it from another scholar shows that he did not have any propri-
etary attitude about this discovery. He went out of his way to show that he shared 
this view of philosophy as therapy of the soul with scholars such as Paul rab-
bow,58 andré-Jean Voelke,59 or Juliusz Domański.60 according to Hadot, some but 
not all philosophers of the early modern and modern periods continued this tradi-
tion, and Wittgenstein is a prime example of the practice of philosophy as a way 
51. Ibid.
52. Ingemar düring, Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens (Heidelberg: c. 
Winter, 1966).
53. Ibid.
5. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 106.
55. Pierre Hadot, “la notion de mentalité collective,” in Etudes de philosophie ancienne (Paris: 
les belles lettres, 1998), 115-121.
56. Ibid., 116.
57. Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: albin michel, 2002), 6, quo-
ting Victor goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon: structure et méthode dialectique (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1963), 3.
58. Paul rabbow, Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike (munich: Kösel-Verlag), 
195.
59. andré-Jean Voelke, La philosophie comme thérapie de l’âme: études de philosophie hellénis-
tique (Paris: cerf, 1993).
60. Juliusz Domański, La philosophie, théorie ou manière de vivre? Les controverses de l’anti-
quité à la renaissance (Fribourg: editions universitaires; Paris: cerf, 1996).
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of life. In that sense, for Hadot, the classic debate about the discrepancy between 
the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Inves-
tigations is moot for two reasons: first, because the assumption of doctrinal coher-
ence is highly questionable in general; second, because the continuity resides not 
in the doctrine but in the ethical stance. as Sandra laugier points out, Hadot was 
one of the very first interpreters to see the “therapeutic” dimension that runs from 
the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.61 this interpretation of Wittgen-
stein was later developed by Stanley cavell, James conant, and cora diamond.62 
the important point for the purposes of this study is Hadot’s insistence that he 
was not drawn to this notion of philosophy as a way of life for spiritual or ethi-
cal reasons. He did not come to the conclusion that ancient philosophy consisted 
mostly of spiritual exercises because he had a taste for philosophy of an edifying 
kind. He was drawn to this conclusion for reasons that were both conceptual and 
exegetical.63 as we have seen above, in the conversations with carlier and da-
vidson, Hadot initially presents himself as a philosopher who chose to become a 
philologist. the reasons for that initial choice are not fully explained, except for 
the suggestion that Hadot went deliberately against his natural inclination. In the 
encounter with Wittgenstein, Hadot went full circle: now a philologist, he found a 
philosophical rationale for the practice of philology, and the insight he drew from 
reading Wittgenstein allowed him to solve what had traditionally been a puzzle 
for philologists, namely the incoherence of ancient philosophers.
IV. eXegeSIS aNd mISUNderStaNdINg
Faithfulness to the author’s intent was such an essential obligation for Hadot that 
he used uncharacteristically strong language to criticize what he saw as relativ-
ism or arbitrariness in interpretation: “I detest those monographs which, instead 
of allowing the author to speak by remaining close to the text, engage in obscure 
speculation claiming to decode and reveal the author’s tacit meaning, while the 
reader is left without any idea of what the thinker really ‘said.’”6 Hadot adds that 
“our time is fascinating for many reasons.” However, “from a literary and philo-
sophical point of view, it could be defined as the era of misinterpretation (l’ère du 
contresens), if not the era of the pun: on any subject, anything goes! (n’importe 
quoi à propos de n’importe quoi).”65
this invective against the zeitgeist is only one aspect of Hadot’s position. on 
the one hand, misinterpretation is characteristic of the reading practices of our 
time. on the other hand, according to Hadot, misinterpretation has played a key 
role in the history of philosophy itself. Hadot first wrote about this issue in a 68 
article entitled “Philosophy, exegesis and misinterpretation.”66 Hadot begins with 
61. Sandra laugier, “langage ordinaire et exercice spirituel,” in davidson and Worms, ed., 
L’enseignement des antiques, l’enseignement des modernes, 61-79.
62. Ibid., 61.
63. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 59.
6. Pierre Hadot, La Citadelle intérieure: Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle (Paris: Fayard, 
1997), 10.
65. Ibid.
66. Pierre Hadot, “Philosophie, exégèse et contresens,” in Etudes de philosophie ancienne, 3-11 
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a sweeping historical assessment: by and large, from antiquity to the present, the 
practice of philosophy has been based on the reading and interpretation of texts 
from earlier periods. In other words, the practice of philosophy has been exegeti-
cal in nature. ancient and humanist forms of exegesis had a common purpose: 
the appropriation of ancient texts by the modern reader. this appropriation was 
carried out by various techniques, including allegory. With the advent of modern 
philology in the eighteenth century, traditional exegesis was discredited, and the 
interpretations performed by ancient and humanist exegetes were seen as anach-
ronistic distortions of the original intent present in ancient texts. In that sense, 
Hadot argues, all exegesis is misinterpretation. according to Hadot, there were 
two sources of error in the work of pre-enlightenment exegetes. First, they as-
sumed that all the works of a given author formed a coherent whole, and they 
brought together passages taken out of context to construct a coherent doctrine out 
of a corpus that had no apparent coherence. an example of this practice is Plato’s 
five-tier hierarchy of being, never mentioned in Plato’s texts but constructed by 
his neo-Platonic interpreters. Second, pre-enlightenment exegetes brought con-
cepts together from disparate doctrines. For instance, aristotle’s commentators 
used Stoic or Platonic concepts. Such practices, especially when the text consid-
ered was a translation, were sometimes not simply distortions but outright inven-
tions that made something out of nothing. Hadot gives the example of augustine’s 
reading of Psalm 115, 16 [113, 2 in the latin Vulgate]: “the heavens are the 
lord’s heavens.” augustine’s version of the text (in latin, but based on the Septu-
agint bible) is coelum coeli domino (the heaven of heavens belongs to the lord). 
augustine then speculates on the existence of a “heaven” as a cosmological real-
ity he identifies with the realm of the intelligible, and he explains how to situate 
this heaven with respect to the heaven mentioned in Genesis. Hadot insists that, 
from the point of view of the Hebrew bible, “this whole construction is based 
on thin air.”67 as the great theorist and practitioner of the christian exegetical 
method, augustine seems to be one of Hadot’s favorite targets. In his inaugural 
lecture at the collège de France, Hadot mentioned the famous formula from au-
gustine: in interiore homine habitat veritas68 (it is in the inner person that truth 
dwells). this formula, appropriated by Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations, is at 
the root of the modern concept of the subject. yet, as Hadot shows, in crafting it, 
augustine inadvertently put together two segments of sentences from the Letter 
to the Ephesians that were semantically unconnected in Paul’s original. Hence, 
“a group of words whose unity was originally purely material, or, which was a 
misunderstanding of the latin translator, was given a new meaning by augustine, 
and then by Husserl, thus taking its place in the vast tradition of deepening the 
idea of self-consciousness.”69
(Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie [1968], 333-339). “Philosophy, exegesis 
and creative mistakes,” in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 71-77. michael chase’s translation 
of “creative mistakes” softens the meaning of contresens, a word used by classics teachers in France 
to refer to a translation that misconstrues the meaning of an entire sentence—three contresens in one 
translation typically result in a failing grade.
67. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 75. 
68. augustine, De vera religione, 39.72.
69. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 66 [Inaugural lecture at the collège de France, February 
18, 1983].
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 If the practice of philosophy was mostly exegetical, and if all exegesis is predi-
cated on misunderstanding, then it is the entire history of philosophy that can be 
written as a comedy of errors. this thought can be “somewhat frightening”70 to 
modern historians. on the other hand, Hadot insists, misunderstanding has been 
the main engine behind the creation of new philosophical concepts. For instance, 
the distinction between “being” in the infinitive (τò εἶναι) and “being” in the par-
ticiple (τò ὄν) was invented by Porphyry in order to solve a difficulty posed by a 
passage in Plato. this distinction played a key role in the history of metaphysics 
up to Heidegger. “the history of the notion of being,” Hadot adds, is “marked by 
a whole series of such creative mistakes.”71 this remark can be extended to intel-
lectual history in general: “to write the history of thought is to write the history 
of misunderstandings.”72
Hadot seems to have ambivalent feelings about this fact. on the one hand he 
has a quasi-Voltairean take on the history of the human mind as the record of hu-
man errors.73 on the other hand he is ready to embrace it, both as a historian and 
as a philosopher. His 200 book, The Veil of Isis, is the history of the successive 
meanings of a single saying by Heraclitus: physis kryptesthai philei (Nature loves 
to hide). Hadot shows that there is almost no connection between the original 
meaning of the sentence and the meaning it had for early modern and modern phi-
losophers of nature. For Heraclitus, the sentence meant something like “what is 
born tends to disappear” (based on the early sense of physis as that which is born 
and dies). For early modern philosophers the saying referred to the notion of ar-
cana naturae: the hidden secrets of nature that science sought to reveal. one may 
ask why Hadot felt the need to write such a history: historians want to tell stories 
that offer a mix of continuity and change. the saying in question has had such 
disparate meanings that there is arguably no point in considering them together. 
but precisely in this case there is a remarkable continuity: over 2,500 years, it is 
the exact same formula that has been interpreted and reinterpreted. the saying 
by Heraclitus is one of those “good maxims” that endure successive reinterpreta-
tions: “a good aphorism is too hard for the tooth of time, and is not worn away by 
all the centuries, although it serves as food for every epoch. Hence it is the great-
est paradox in literature, the imperishable in the midst of change, the nourish-
ment which always remains highly valued, as salt does, and never becomes stupid 
like salt.”7 this passage from Nietzsche appears in the conclusion of The Veil of 
Isis, and is less a conclusion or an explanation than the reaffirmation of a puzzle. 
Some sentences have a remarkable staying power, but what makes their perma-
nence possible is something of a mystery. the only thing that comes close to an 
explanation of this phenomenon is an allusion to Hans blumenberg’s work on 
myth. Hadot endorses blumenberg’s idea that certain metaphors (for instance, the 
70. Hadot, “Philosophie, exégèse et contresens,” 9.
71. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 75.
72. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, 17.
73. “there is the history of opinions which is hardly anything but a collection of human 
errors.” Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, “History” article, transl. H. I. Woolf 
(New york: Knopf, 192).
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, transl. Paul V. cohn (amherst, Ny: Prometheus, 
2009), Part II, §168.
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nakedness of truth, nature as writing and as a book, the world as a clock) act like 
“prefabricated models”75 that condition our thought in ways that remain largely 
invisible to us. according to Hadot, “these traditional metaphors are linked inti-
mately with what are called commonplaces in rhetoric.”76 one should add that the 
subtitle of Hadot’s book (“an essay on the History of the Idea of Nature”) can 
easily be misunderstood. Hadot’s intent was not to write the history of a unit-idea 
called “Nature.” It was rather to write the history of something much more con-
crete, namely one sentence, and one image that has often been associated with it: 
the unveiling of the half-naked goddess artemis.
In his 1962 article on language games and philosophy, Hadot pointed out that 
the ancients had a better understanding than we do of what it is to play a language 
game: “For them a saying had naturally several meanings, i.e. several possible 
applications.”77 the rhetorical culture of antiquity was an oral culture, in which 
ready-made topoi were given meaning through a performance that was always 
singular and tied to a particular place and a particular time. We are less sensi-
tive to these aspects, says Hadot, because philosophy is no longer practiced as 
“speech.”78 It is now practiced “not only as writing, but as printed writing.”79 
In the spirit of Hadot’s reading of Wittgenstein, we can draw an example of 
what the ancients were up to from the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein 
discusses a language game that consists in considering one face and thinking of it 
as timid, then courageous. this does not mean imagining that the timid-looking 
face would belong to someone who performed acts of courage, because such acts 
could be associated with any face. It means reading courage into the exact same 
facial expressions that indicated timidity before. Wittgenstein concludes that “the 
reinterpretation of a facial expression can be compared to the reinterpretation of 
a chord in music, when we hear it as a modulation into this, then into that key.”80 
the same musical theme is played in a different key, as the same face is seen as 
conveying different expressions. In the case of facial expressions, the change in 
meaning is performed by imagining a different context. For instance, the same 
smiling face can be seen as kind or cruel by imagining that the smiler “was smil-
ing down on a child at play, or again on the suffering of an enemy.”81 the same 
game can be played in philosophy. Hadot points out that “once it is taken out of its 
original context,” a philosophical formula “can change its meaning without any 
difficulty, i.e. be re-used in a different language game.”82
Hadot concluded the penultimate paragraph of his 1968 article on exegesis with 
the following statement: “It seems that we moderns have lost the comprehen-
sion of what ancient rhetoric was.”83 It is remarkable that in the past forty years 
75. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, xi.
76. Ibid.
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translation.
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there has been a great deal of interest in the ancient and early modern rhetorical 
tradition, and it can be said that we now have a much better understanding of the 
performative aspects of ancient and humanist rhetoric.8 In a few paragraphs of 
his Encyclopaedia Universalis article on “conversion,” also published in 1968, 
Hadot gave a remarkably forward-looking summary of the issues that have since 
been studied by the historians of rhetoric: the art of rhetoric arose in the context 
of greek and roman judicial and political culture; the concrete goal of rhetoric 
was to “change the soul”; the philosophers themselves used rhetorical means to 
convert others to the philosophical way of life.85 but precisely, from Hadot’s point 
of view, this better understanding of rhetoric is tied to a return of allegorical ex-
egesis in the practice of philosophy: “contemporary philosophical discourse has 
once again become exegetical, and, sad to say, it often interprets texts with the 
same violence used by ancient practitioners of allegory.”86 reading courage into a 
timid-looking face would be a very good image of what ancient philosophers were 
doing, and in that sense the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy recaptures 
something that was essential to the practice of ancient philosophy. on the other 
hand this exercise is a violent one because it severs all ties to what gave life to 
previous utterances of a particular image or sentence.
V. coNclUSIoN: WrItINg HIStory aS COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM
For Wittgenstein, “understanding a sentence” has two meanings: it refers to what 
can be said with other words, and what can be said only with the same words. or 
rather the concept of understanding includes both meanings together. 
How these two meanings of “understanding” can be held together was a funda-
mental problem for Hadot. In his work as a historian of philosophy, Hadot was a 
strict contextualist who made every effort to avoid anachronistic interpretations. 
at the same time, he did not hesitate to draw parallels between historically un-
related concepts like the concept of physis in Heraclitus and the concept of or-
ganic destruction in claude bernard.87 Similarly, he had no qualms about linking 
thoreau to “a kind of universal Stoicism,” and “a kind of universal epicurean-
ism.”88 In his conversations with carlier and davidson, Hadot described the pres-
ent-minded appropriation of old concepts as a “supplement,” comparable to what 
aristotle said about pleasure. For Hadot, “there is always added to the effort of 
objectivity a supplement, a surplus, which is the possibility of finding our spiritual 
nourishment in it.”89
as we have seen above, Hadot criticized the lack of historical sense in con-
temporary philosophers, but he also saw their allegorical use of old concepts as 
a return to an ancient exegetical tradition that was itself associated with the no-
8. the International Society for the History of rhetoric was founded in 1977. In the French con-
text, see marc Fumaroli, L’Âge de l’éloquence (geneva: droz, 1980).
85. Hadot, Encyclopaedia Universalis, article on “conversion.”
86. Hadot, “Philosophy, exegesis, and creative mistakes,” 76.
87. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, 12.
88. “Il y a de nos jours des professeurs de philosophie, mais pas de philosophes . . .” Henry D. 
Thoreau, Cahiers de l’Herne (Paris: l’Herne, 199), 191.
89. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 68.
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tion of philosophy as a way of life. In that sense, Foucault could be criticized 
for his anachronistic interpretations of Hellenistic philosophy: he projected late-
twentieth-century aesthetic concerns onto the Hellenistic notion of the care of the 
self,90 he had little interest in philological issues, and he used outdated, unreliable 
editions of ancient texts.91 However, his disregard for context paradoxically al-
lowed him to recapture something that was essential to the Hellenistic practice 
of philosophy: the individual appropriation of old texts for the purpose of living 
the good life. It should be added that, from Hadot’s point of view, the historian’s 
effort to achieve an objective understanding of past discourses could itself be seen 
as a spiritual exercise: “to study a text or microbes or the stars, one must undo 
oneself from one’s own subjectivity.”92 or, as Hadot put it in 2007, “objectivity 
is a result of the self working on the self (travail de soi sur soi).”93 In that sense, 
the historian of philosophy is like the Stoic philosopher who in his daily medita-
tions tried to rise above his individual self in order to attain “the universality of 
the rational self.”9
In their 2001 conversation, davidson asked Hadot the following fundamental 
question: “How to reconcile the objectivity, albeit probable, of the interpretation 
with the actual sense of a philosophical text?”95 (N.b.: In the question that was 
originally posed in French, actuel means current or present). davidson went on to 
remind Hadot of the preface he wrote for the French translation of ernst bertram’s 
book on Nietzsche. In it Hadot defined the writing of history as the coincidence 
of opposites:
the writing of history, indeed probably like all human activity, must be a coincidentia op-
positorum by trying to respond to two equally urgent contradictory requirements. In order 
to perceive and evaluate historical reality, there must be, on the one hand, a conscious and 
total self-commitment, and on the other hand, an intended objectivity and impartiality. to 
my eyes, it is only the ascesis of scientific rigor, that self-detachment required for an objec-
tive and impartial judgment that will be able to give us the right to implicate ourselves in 
history, to give it an existential sense.96
In other words, the historian’s task is to be totally objective and totally subjective 
at the same time. How this may happen is not totally clear. that Hadot chose to 
make these comments in a preface to bertram is somewhat surprising, because 
bertram’s book is a striking example of what Hadot claims to detest in literary 
criticism and in the history of philosophy. Hadot begins his preface with a pas-
sionate endorsement: “I have often read and reread this book, and I have always 
found it new, unexpected, unique.”97 yet bertram’s book is deliberately allegori-
cal (the subtitle is Attempt at a Mythology). It begins with this statement: “all the 
90. “reflections on the Idea of ‘cultivation of the Self’,” in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 
206-213.
91. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 136.
92. Ibid., 66.
93. davidson and Worms, ed., L’enseignement des antiques, l’enseignement des modernes, 29
9. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 67.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. Quoted from preface to ernst bertram, Nietzsche: Essai de mythologie, translated into 
French by robert Pitrou, preface by Pierre Hadot (Paris: editions du Félin, 2007), 3 (Nietzsche: 
Versuch einer Mythologie [berlin: georg bondi, 1918]).
97. In bertram, Nietzsche: Essai de mythologie, 5.
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past is but a parable,”98 followed by the claim that “no historical method can give 
us a window on lived reality ‘as it actually was,’ as nineteenth-century advocates 
of a naïve historical realism so often seem to have believed.”99 Hadot explains 
that bertram’s opening sentence is “pregnant with meaning:”100 Alles Gewesene 
ist nur ein Gleichnis (literally, “all that was is nothing but symbol”) is an allusion 
to the conclusion of the second part of goethe’s Faust: Alles Vergängliche ist nur 
ein Gleichnis (literally, “all that passes is nothing but symbol”). and of course, 
as bertram’s american translator points out, the second sentence is an allusion 
to ranke’s oft-quoted passage on writing history wie es eigentlich gewesen (“as 
it actually was”). bertram’s Gleichnis (borrowed from goethe) is a polemical 
response to ranke’s eigentlich: the symbolic against the real. as we have seen 
above, Hadot has no patience for those who overlook the letter of a text and claim 
“to decode and reveal the author’s tacit meaning.” yet he approvingly describes 
bertram’s method as “psychoanalytic in the broad sense of the term,” and leading 
to an exploration of Nietzsche’s “imaginary” (imaginaire).101 He praises bertram 
for having identified previously overlooked symbols that give us access to “the 
depth of Nietzsche’s personality.”102 Hadot also insists that bertram’s interpreta-
tion, for all its “enthusiasm,”103 is not arbitrary and relies constantly on Nietzsche’s 
text without “forcing” or “over-interpreting”10 it. In that sense, bertram was still 
operating within the limits and guidelines of “the great historical school of the 
nineteenth century.”105 this is why bertram represents an ideal coincidentia op-
positorum: a historian who is both totally detached and totally engaged.
Still, Hadot is deeply critical of bertram’s philosophy of history. He dedicates 
several pages of the preface to a detailed description of Stefan george’s circle as 
the context for understanding not only bertram’s work but also the approach to 
history and philology that is present in both Heidegger and gadamer. He quotes 
from a little-known paper that gadamer contributed to a 1985 colloquium on Stef-
an george and the sciences.106 In it gadamer argues that george’s fundamental 
contribution to historical method was the notion of Form (Gestalt). Intellectual bi-
ographies written by members of george’s circle were Gestaltbiographen. Instead 
of telling the story of someone’s life as a succession of events or an accumulation 
of influences, they looked for a Gestalt that presented a life as a coherent whole. 
of course bertram’s book on Nietzsche is a brilliant example of this method. 
aside from the opening lines we have seen above, there are few theoretical pro-
nouncements in bertram. therefore, instead of directly criticizing bertram, Hadot 
chooses to criticize two thinkers he sees as representing very similar philosophies 
98. ernst bertram, Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology, transl. robert e. Norton (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2009), 1. the French translation of bertram’s book by Pitrou was first published in 
1932. there had been no english translation until 2009, presumably because of the Nazi sympathies 
bertram expressed in the 1930s.
99. Ibid.
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of history: raymond aron107 and Hans-georg gadamer.108 the association is not 
as odd as it might seem at first sight. Aron wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 
limits of historical objectivity109 after a stay in germany during which he discov-
ered dilthey’s philosophy of history. the members of his dissertation committee, 
who were all disciples of durkheim, read aron’s work with deep suspicion and 
saw it as an attack on scientific method. 110 as to gadamer, in Truth and Method, 
he borrows heavily from dilthey and criticizes him at the same time.111 most 
importantly for the purposes of this study, gadamer shows that dilthey was fun-
damentally interested in describing historical phenomena as coherent and ever-
expanding wholes—a process culminating in the knowledge of universal history. 
In that sense his approach was hermeneutic: the whole derived its meaning from 
the parts, and each part derived its meaning from the whole “just as a word can be 
understood only in terms of the whole sentence, and the sentence fully understood 
only within the context of the whole text, indeed of the whole of literature.”112
this aspect is what Hadot is most fundamentally critical of. He greatly admires 
bertram’s book as a work of art that gives us profound insights into Nietzsche’s 
personality, yet he sees the hermeneutic approach as a “regression”113 that brings 
us back to pre-enlightenment allegorical exegesis. In that sense any attempt to 
describe a person or an epoch as a coherent whole is allegorical and unscientific. 
at the same time, this regression recaptures the ancient and humanist tradition of 
historia magistra vitae, and the allegorical use of past events is consistent with 
the idea that truth does not come to life unless it is appropriated in a personal and 
individual way.11
In the end, Hadot’s assessment of bertram’s work is a deeply ambivalent one. 
the coincidentia oppositorum can be seen in a strongly positive way. It carries 
mystical overtones and points to the Heraclitean notion of the unity of opposites. 
As Hadot puts it, an antithetical structure “reflects the very constitution of reality, 
in which contraries coincide.”115 It can also mean the coexistence of admirable 
qualities and unforgivable shortcomings. In bertram, Hadot admires “the sophis-
ticated construction, the monumentality, the poetry, the lofty inspiration, the vi-
brant sensitivity.”116 at the same time, he is mindful of “the lyrical and frequently 
ponderous style, the total absence of footnotes to identify quotes, the massive and 
unsupported claims in the field of ancient religious history.”117
107. In bertram, Nietzsche: Essai de mythologie, 20-21.
108. Ibid., 31-3.
109. raymond aron, Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire: Essai sur les limites de l’objecti-
vité historique, ed. Sylvie mesure [1938] (Paris: gallimard, 1986).
110. See ibid., presentation by Sylvie mesure, ii-iv.
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donald g. marshall (New york: crossroad, 1992), 218-22 (Wahrheit und Methode [tübingen: 
mohr, 1960]).
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Hadot’s most often quoted claim is that ancient philosophy was a life choice, 
and his support for this claim is based on careful, objective reconstruction of the 
context of ancient philosophical texts. In that sense, objective historical work is 
what gives us access to ancient philosophy as a form of life (to borrow an expres-
sion from Wittgenstein that Hadot also liked to use). but precisely, for us, the life 
of ancient philosophers is completely out of reach. as we have seen above, Hadot 
insists that “the meaning intended by the ancient author is never current (actuel). 
It is ancient, and that is all there is to it.”118 to us, these forms of life are dead, 
and Hadot does not subscribe to the romantic belief that the past can be some-
how brought back to life by the power of historical inquiry. the only way we can 
find spiritual nourishment in ancient philosophical texts and get something from 
them that sustains our lives is by ignoring their original context altogether. only a 
deliberately presentist appropriation of ancient texts will make them existentially 
meaningful to us. yet this exercise is even more violent than the allegory practiced 
by ancient and humanist philologists, who were often aware of historical differ-
ence and sought to bridge the gap between the truth claims found in ancient texts 
and the standards and expectations of the present.119
It may be argued that, far from being a “regression,” gadamer’s philosophi-
cal hermeneutics is a deliberate and thoughtful reappropriation of the rhetorical 
tradition Hadot says had been forgotten. as gadamer puts it, “Hermeneutic work 
is based on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness.”120 texts from the past are 
strange and familiar at the same time, and “the true locus of hermeneutics is this 
in-between.”121 a good interpretation produces a point of view that is neither the 
reader’s initial point of view nor the ancient author’s, but a fusion of both, as hap-
pens between two parties in a successful conversation. If you say something and 
I say it back to you in my own words, it does not necessarily mean that I have 
betrayed it or turned it into something trivial. It may mean that you and I have 
come to an agreement about something. Hadot is mindful of the fact that gadamer 
sought to recapture the spirit of Plato’s dialectic in his hermeneutics.122 He is, 
however, deeply skeptical about the success of this enterprise, and he notices that 
the conversations in george’s circle were less conversations than lectures by the 
master to his adoring fans.123 this may well be a true account of george’s circle, 
but gadamer’s hermeneutics does offer a solution to the puzzle of coincidentia 
oppositorum. For gadamer, it is not necessary to be a radical presentist in order to 
extract living truths from ancient texts; conversely, a historical approach to ancient 
texts need not assume that these texts are dead letter, and the historically minded 
interpreter can be open to the possibility that some of the truth claims present in 
ancient texts might be valid. For gadamer, “the call to leave aside the concepts of 
the present does not mean a naïve transposition into the past. It is, rather, an essen-
118. Hadot, The Present Alone is Our Happiness, 68 (translation modified).
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tially relative demand that has meaning only in relation to one’s own concepts.”12 
the operative word in gadamer’s sentence is “relative” (but does not imply rela-
tivism). In order to avoid anachronistic interpretations, historians never cease to 
translate past languages into a language they can understand. as gadamer puts it, 
“to think historically means, in fact, to perform the transposition that the concepts 
of the past undergo when we try to think in them.”125 In that sense the life that 
animated ancient philosophical conversations is itself out of reach, but it is now 
present in the conversations we have with past philosophical texts.
gadamer’s approach is accommodative. It involves a “mediation”126 between 
the ideas present in old texts and one’s own thinking. Hadot, for his part, does 
not seem interested in seeking a middle ground. translated into gadamer’s lan-
guage, his position would consist in embracing absolute strangeness and absolute 
familiarity at the same time. this position may not be as idiosyncratic as it seems. 
With the caveat that “doctrinal comparisons” are rarely meaningful, one could 
see similarities between Hadot and Skinner, in addition to their common reliance 
on Wittgenstein. like Hadot, Skinner in his more recent work jumps from strict 
contextualism to deliberately present-minded appropriations of classical political 
concepts.127 and like Hadot’s 1968 article, Skinner’s 1969 article on meaning and 
understanding in the history of ideas mocked the “mythology of coherence”128 that 
affects the work of intellectual historians. What is almost unique to Hadot is the 
mystical dimension of his approach, which draws the ultimate consequences of a 
rhetorical understanding of philosophy as performance. For Hadot, if we take se-
riously the idea that philosophical texts matter less for what they say than for what 
they do, after we have elucidated what they say, we should let them transform us 
and change our perception of the world. Interpretation yields to silent meditation 
or contemplation. 
this mystical dimension is quite obvious in Hadot’s later work (notably in The 
Veil of Isis), but it was arguably there from the very beginning. during Hadot’s 
last public appearance in 2010, Frédéric Worms mentioned a 192 issue of Fon-
taine edited by Jean Wahl on poetry as spiritual exercise, and suggested that it 
was an important early influence. Hadot replied that he remembered reading an 
article with this title, but did not remember it was by Jean Wahl. His recollec-
tion was correct. the article entitled “Poetry as Spiritual exercise”129 was written 
by edmond Jaloux (1878–199), a French academician known for his essays on 
german and english romanticism. on the other hand, it is clear from reading the 
entire issue, including a short, untitled note by Wahl himself, 130 that all the con-
tributors had written on the topic at Jean Wahl’s invitation and that the expression 
“poetry as spiritual exercise” was Wahl’s. two years later, Wahl published another 
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short piece in The Chimera entitled “on Poetry.”131 Written in the same spirit as 
the 192 issue of Fontaine and referencing it, the piece defined poetry as a coin-
cidentia oppositorum between commonplaces and individuality, and spoke about 
the convergence between philosophy and poetry, with references to Heraclitus, 
Whitehead, and Heidegger.
clearly, there are many differences between Jean Wahl’s philosophical agenda 
in the 190s and the philosophical agenda that Hadot developed in later years. 
one must note, on the other hand, the staying power of expressions like spiritual 
exercise and coincidentia oppositorum. good phrases are too hard for the teeth 
of time. Hadot’s conversations with Wahl in the 190s must have been about 
philosophy and poetry. during his last public appearance, Hadot indicated that 
he intended to write his doctoral dissertation on Heidegger and rilke as “poets 
of existence,” and that the inspiration for this topic came from gabriel marcel’s 
work on orphism.132 Why then did Hadot “defect” to the disenchanted realm of 
history and philology? as an immediate psychological explanation, one might 
invoke Hadot’s desire to resist his own deep-seated inclination toward esoteric en-
thusiasm. a more philosophical explanation is that Hadot sought to give a deeper 
meaning to the expression coincidentia oppositorum. For him, the coincidence of 
opposites came to mean the coincidence between philosophy and history.
When Hadot gave his first talk on Wittgenstein at the Collège philosophique 
in 1959, he ended with a quote from the last pages of the Tractatus: “So too at 
death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.”133 then, says Hadot, “there 
was an extraordinary silence: usually people in the audience shake their feet, clear 
their throats, or wiggle slightly. but the attention at that moment was intense.”13 
Similarly, the 2001 volume of conversations with carlier and davidson ends with 
a deliberate imitation of what arrian did when he put together the Handbook of 
Epictetus: he left the reader with a series of quotes from various authors who 
summarized what he had meant to say. thus Hadot’s book ends with “a short, 
chronologically ordered anthology of texts . . . about the sentiment of existence or 
the cosmic and ‘oceanic’ sentiment.”135 the very broad range of authors includes 
Zhuangzi, Seneca, Pascal, blake, goethe, thoreau, rilke, Wittgenstein, and cé-
zanne. “to comment on them,” says Hadot, “would be to make them fade. they 
speak for themselves, and I propose them as a way to continue to communicate 
indirectly with my readers.”136
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